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S. J. V. MALLOCH
Frontinus and Domitian: the politics of the Strategemata
I
In Rome of the late first century A.D. few aristocrats could compete with the preemi-
nence of Sextus Iulius Frontinus. A career that boasted a consulship (72 or 73) and
governorship of Britain under Vespasian (73/4–77), a legateship of the Lower German
army (81–83/4) and proconsulship of Asia under Domitian (c. 84–5), and oversight of
the water supply under Nerva (from 97) rose to the awesome heights of second and
third consulships with Trajan in a crucial period of transition, the second as suffectus
in 98, the third as ordinarius in 100.1 Frontinus’ near-consecutive consulships were
unheard of outside the imperial family,2 and a third consulship elevated him to a
status approaching that of the princeps himself.3 The distinction does not merely illus-
trate his support of the post-Domitianic dispensation: it illustrates his immense
political importance to Trajan at the time of his succession.4 Contemporaries too
observed Frontinus’ eminence. The younger Pliny is praising Frontinus’ political emi-
nence when he calls him a princeps uir and claims that ciuitas nostra considered him
spectatissimus (Epist. 4. 8. 3; 5. 1. 5). Tacitus too had Frontinus’ qualities as a statesman
An early version of this essay was written during tenure of an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow-
ship in the Abteilung für Alte Geschichte at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, and
read to audiences there and in Cambridge. For comments and encouragement at that time I am
grateful to M. Zimmermann, M. Beard, R. Osborne, and M. D. Reeve. Since returning to
this essay after working on other projects I have benefited from the feedback of A. R. Birley,
P. D. A. Garnsey, A. D. Lee, and M. Lowrie.
1 See Birley 2005, 68–71; for a fuller exposition see Eck 1989, 47–62. For the legateship of
the lower German army see Eck – Pangerl 2003, 210, and also below. For Frontinus’ tenure as
curator aquarum, to 100 or to his death, see also Rodgers 2004, 5–8.
2 The consecutive consulships held by Marcus Agrippa II in 28 and III in 27 can be inter-
preted as rewards for the crucial victories he secured for Octavian: so Eck 2002, 219 n. 27. The
precedent of Agrippa is suggestive of how Trajan’s reward of consulships to Frontinus could be
interpreted, but Agrippa’s privileged position and marriage into the imperial family place him in
a different category to Frontinus.
3 Cf. Plin. Epist. 2. 1. 2 (sc. Verginius Rufus) perfunctus est tertio consulatu, ut summum
fastigium priuati hominis impleret, cum principis noluisset; Pan. 60. 4–5 (at 61. 2–6, however,
Pliny takes care to assert Trajan’s supremacy; cf. below on Aelian). Eight senators achieved three
consulships between 27 B.C. and A.D. 100: Eck 1989, 60.
4 See below on Frontinus’ role in the succession of Trajan.
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in mind when he judged him to be as great a man as the times allowed (Agr. 17. 2 uir
magnus quantum licebat). Frontinus also received accolades as a military man. Tacitus’
judgment comes amid praise of Frontinus’ governorship of Britain, a military com-
mand. Aelian was inspired to pursue his studies of Greek tactical science after discuss-
ing the subject at Formiae with «the distinguished consular» Frontinus, «a man of
great reputation by virtue of his experience in war» (Tact. Praef. 3);5 Frontinus stands
out here as an authoritative source (cf. 1. 2), and as a source of authority for Aelian’s
own theoretical enterprise. Later, Vegetius singles Frontinus out from the complures
who wrote on military science after Cato and observed that his industria had won Tra-
jan’s approval (2. 3. 7 diuo Traiano ab eiusmodi comprobatus industria; cf. 1. 8. 1). The
codification of Frontinus’ military experience and knowledge in works such as the
Strategemata, written under Domitian, contributed to his exceptional standing
among contemporaries and posterity. This should not surprise: these works were part
of Frontinus’ public persona, and the offices and commands that he held provide one
context for understanding why he wrote what he did. What, in turn, do these writings
contribute to our understanding of Frontinus’ public persona? How and where does
his Strategemata, the lone survivor of his military treatises, position him politically
during the principate of Domitian? Did Frontinus later react against Domitian after
his death, in the manner of a Martial, a Tacitus, or a Pliny?
Scholars seem to sidestep these questions when they describe the Strategemata as
«simply antiquarian».6 R. H. Rodgers claims in the introduction to his edition of the
De Aquaeductu that the Strategemata «reveals their author’s antiquarian bent; like his
gromatical writings, they were ‹safely apolitical›».7 Such descriptions in fact imply a
political position: Frontinus played it safe. The assumption is that writing on military
strategy under Domitian was a dangerous business, and there is a hint too that Fron-
tinus might have painted Domitian in darker colours, had he been free to do so.
Recently the Strategemata has been politicised along these lines in an attempt to
recruit Frontinus into the ranks of those Silver Latin authors who are held to be «sub-
versive» of Domitian. There is a whiff of the old school of interpretation in the remark
of A. Turner that Frontinus included exempla about Domitian «simply because of
their practicality», but more radically he claims that Frontinus’ praise of Domitian’s
generalship «does not mean that Frontinus did not intend criticism of that princeps to
be understood at some level», particularly in his silence about imperial generals, «the
5 Aelian is careful to establish the all-time primacy in military distinction of the emperor to
whom he dedicated the work (praef. 4), Trajan (Devine 1989, 31) or possibly Hadrian (Mat-
thew 2012, 134–37). Translations of Aelian are Devine’s.
6 So Hanson 2007, 3. The Strategemata is considered strictly in terms of its usefulness on
military matters by Gilliver 2007, 124–25.
7 Rodgers 2004, 3. In the reference that Rodgers supplies, Syme 1958, 68, does not use the
expression «safely apolitical», but wrote that the Strategemata were «for the most part, literary
and antiquated».
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only way in which a writer like Frontinus could convey the jealousy and despotic
nature» of Domitian.8 This interest in Frontinus’ presentation of Domitian and
imperial figures is appropriate, but the inferences, drawn tendentiously, are unsound.
Frontinus’ inclusion in the Strategemata of a select number of exempla dating to the
principate is a significant methodological manoeuvre that bestows implicit praise on
Domitian, the emperor who attracts the most exempla, and his presentation of Domi-
tian in those exempla is complimentary, often explicitly so. Frontinus also associates
himself with exemplary status by narrating an exemplum in which he appears under
the command of Domitian, and his positive connection with Domitian suggests how
the emperor’s other appearances in the Strategemata should be read. Frontinus’ praise
of and identification with Domitian in a text written during his principate advertised
a sympathetic, active involvement with the regime. An important question follows:
how problematic for Frontinus was his support of Domitian after 96? Frontinus’ pres-
entation of Domitian in the De Aquaeductu demonstrates that he did not fall in with
the loud reaction against him by contemporaries such as the younger Pliny. Pliny gives
the impression, not altogether unbiased, that Frontinus was not inclined to agonise
about the past. This was more than a matter of personality. Frontinus was too power-
ful a figure on the political scene to need to excuse his conduct under Domitian.
II
The literature of stratagems in Greece and Rome arose from a variety of influences, in
Greece from the warfare that permeated Homer and Herodotus, in Rome from Greek
precedents and from laudationes funebres of great men. A distinct genre of military lit-
erature had developed in the Greek world by the fourth century B.C. with the aim of
instructing through example.9 Stratagems could be collected for use in rhetorical
schools or deployed within texts on war (e.g. Aeneas Tacticus’ Strategika; Pyrrhus’
Tactica) or form works in themselves, such as Frontinus’.10 While the Factorum ac dic-
torum memorabilium libri IX of the Tiberian Valerius Maximus is the earliest extant
collection of exempla, which contains one chapter of stratagems,11 Frontinus’ Stra-
tegemata is the first extant independent collection of stratagems, even if it is a supple-
ment to a work, now lost, on the rei militaris scientia.12 According to E. Wheeler,
8 Turner 2007, 443, 445.
9 Wheeler 2010, 19–22.
10 For Pyrrhus’ Tactica, which contains strategemata, cf. Front. Strat. 2.6.10; Wheeler 1988,
14 n.40; 2010, 21.
11 7. 4. Relevant material also occurs at 7. 2; 7. 3; 9. 6. See Wheeler 1988, 14–17; 2010, 22.
12 Strat. 1. praef. 1: cum ad instruendam rei militaris scientiam unus ex numero studiosorum eius
accesserim, eique destinato quantum cura nostra ualuit satisfecisse uisus sim, deberi adhuc institutae
arbitror operae ut sollertia ducum facta. See Wheeler 1988, 19; 2010, 21. References in other
authors to Frontinus may be to the lost work on military science and the Strategemata: Aelian
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Frontinus comes at the beginning of a «golden age» for collections of stratagems (in
terms of known and surviving works) that ends with Polyaenus, and thereafter the
genre disappears until the Byzantine period.13
Frontinus marshals 583 exempla illustrating sollertia ducum facta, ie. strategemata, to
inspire duces to devise and execute similar deeds.14 He emphasises the practical value of
his work by claiming in the preface that it was arranged thoughtfully and could be con-
sulted quickly.15 Structure reflected utility. The first three books treated strategemata:
strategy before the battle, strategy during and after the battle, and strategy for sieges; a
fourth book collected exempla under the broader concept of strategika.16 An index in
the preface of each book lists the species that constitute the strategy under consider-
ation, and exempla are arranged under each species according to the name of the gen-
eral (or peoples) responsible for the exemplum: e.g. Strat. 1. 2 de explorandis consiliis
hostium: 1. 2. 1 Scipio Africanus …, 1. 2. 2 Q. Fabius Maximus bello Etrusco …, 1. 2. 3
Carthaginienses …, etc. The pragmatism of Frontinus’ approach is thrown into relief
by the structure adopted by Polyaenus in his Strategika, which he wrote in the context
of the Parthian war of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (161–66).17 The Strategika is
more broadly conceived than the Strategemata, more overtly literary in its pretensions,
and structured differently.18 Polyaenus presented his text as a «guidebook of military
knowledge» that offered its dedicatees a «collection of past experiences» and their gen-
erals in the field a practical, inspirational handbook of stratagems (1. praef. 2, cf. 5.
(above); Vegetius 1. 8. 11 (perstringenda may point to the Strategemata), 2. 3. 7. But cf. Meissner
1999, 79 n. 202, 96–97; Rodgers 2004, 3 n.16 (Aelian and Vegetius refer to the lost work).
13 Wheeler 2010, 19.
14 Strat. 1. praef. 1 ita enim consilii quoque et prouidentiae exemplis succincti duces erunt, unde
illis excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur; praeterea continget ne de euentu trepidet
inuentionis suae, qui probatis eam experimentis comparabit. The sollertia ducum facta are not
meant to be unthinkingly imitated but used by readers to nourish their creation of similar strat-
egies for their particular context: how to think about strategy as much as what to think. Thus
also, with reference to Valerius Maximus, Langlands 2008, 160; 2011, 122.
15 Strat. 1. praef. 2: illud neque ignoro neque infitior, et rerum gestarum scriptores indagine
operis sui hanc quoque partem esse complexos, et ab auctoribus exemplorum quidquid insigne
aliquo modo fui, traditum; sed ut opinor occupatis uelocitate consuli debet. longum est enim singula
et sparsa per immensum corpus historiarum persequi, et hi, qui notabilia excerpserunt, ipso uelut
aceruo rerum confuderunt legentem. nostra sedulitas impendet operam ut, quemadmodum res pos-
cet, ipsum quod exigitur quasi ad interrogatum exhibeat. circumspectis enim generibus praeparaui
opportuna exemplorum ueluti consilia.
16 The work concludes with yet more strategemata (4. 7). For Frontinus’ distinction in termi-
nology see Wheeler 1988, ch. 1; 2010, 33–4. The authenticity of book 4 has not seriously been
challenged since the first half of last century: see Connor 1921, appendix; and in particular
Bendz 1938.
17 For the date of composition see Wheeler 2010, 9–10.
18 For such differences see Wheeler 2010, 36. For structure as suggestive of Polyaenus’ lit-
erary and other interests see Wheeler 2010, 31; Pretzler 2010, 89–90.
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praef.),19 which cover «acts that show generalship against public and private enemies»
in war and in peace (1. praef. 13, 3. praef., 8. praef.).20 Polyaenus arranged the 900
stratagems into 8 books according to theme, ethnography, and geography (e.g. book 7:
barbarians), and within each book exempla are arranged according to individuals or
groups of people.21 This different approach to structuring his text was perhaps
influenced partly by a desire to avoid competing with Frontinus’ Strategemata, which
Polyaenus seems to have sought to complement rather than to replace,22 and partly by
a politicised interest in biography and ethnography (book 4 celebrates Polyaenus’
ancestors, the Macedonians). The result was «literary and readable»23 – and demon-
strates that the layout of Frontinus’ text was better suited for use as a practical guide.
Assertions of practicality are a defining feature of a didactic genre that flourished in
many branches in a culture where exempla were learnt actively from eminent elders
(cf. Tac. Dial. 34. 1; Plin. Epist. 8. 14. 4–5) and through reading texts (cf. Quint. 12. 2.
29–30).24 Frontinus himself observes this distinction in the preface to the De Aquae-
ductu (cf. too Colum. 1. 1. 3–4). He states that he wrote the work to educate himself
on the duties of an unfamiliar office and that he considered it disgraceful for a tole-
rabilis but inexperienced office-holder to learn the ropes from the practical experience
of his adiutores, as was often the case with inexperienced men (Aq. 2). Unsurprisingly
Frontinus comes down on the side of learning from theory. Similarly he had written
the Strategemata to instruct future duces, but that text was the literary expression of
his own practical experience. Dismissing the sincerity of Frontinus’ motivation or the
claims of utility in didactic literature as merely literary topoi is hypercritical and ahis-
torical. Military literature had its place, particularly in a society that had no formal
structures for teaching strategy to budding generals.25 When Cicero boasts that the
outstanding commanders of the first century B.C. learnt their art in war rather than in
books, he admits that warcraft could be studied in books,26 and as governor of Cilicia
he knew that the advice about tactics that he received from L. Papinius Paetus derived
from military manuals.27 When Petilius Cerialis ravaged the island of the Batavi in 70
but spared the property of their leader Iulius Civilis he proceeded nota arte ducum
19 The preface to book 8 expands the audience: «the emperors, the Roman empire, and the
Greeks». Polyaenus’ didactic aims are taken seriously by Wheeler 2010, 30, but are subordi-
nated to his interest in the «shape of the past» by Pretzler 2010, 89–90.
20 For the idea of «strategem» in Polyaenus see Wheeler 2010, 34.
21 Cf. Pretzler 2010, 89.
22 Wheeler 2010, 30–1.
23 Wheeler 2010, 31.
24 See e.g. Campbell 1987, esp. 18–20.
25 Campbell 1987, 22.
26 Font. 43 non litteris homines ad rei militaris scientiam, sed rebus gestis ac uictoriis eruditos; cf.
Sall. Iug. 85. 13.
27 Cicero shows familiarity with Pyrrhus’ Tactica, Cineas’ epitome of Aeneas, and the Cyro-
pedia in a playful opening about tactics (Ad Fam. 9. 25. 1 = SB 114). Wheeler 1998, 13; 2010,
29, suggests that Cicero read these works to prepare for his command.
82 S. J. V. Malloch
(Hist. 5. 23. 3); Polyaenus has Dionysius I deploy the same stratagem, but observed
that other generals used it too (Strategika 5. 2. 18). How did these generals know of the
strategem, and how did Tacitus and Polyaenus know that it was one? Military treatises
probably played a role, in addition to the works of history that authors such as Fron-
tinus state they used (Strat. praef).28 Of course Frontinus could not delimit his audi-
ence, and the specialised subject matter and accessible arrangement of such texts
would have offered rich pickings for bookish historians like Ammianus and for law-
yers and orators seeking illustrative material.29 When the author of the Rhetorica ad
Herennium deferred treatment of the subject of proposing a dolus during a state crisis
to a separate work on res militaris aut administratio rei publicae he revealed at once the
relevance of the subject to orators and the appropriateness of discussing the subject in
a military text.30 Frontinus’ Strategemata was not a rhetorical handbook.
The Strategemata consists of exempla dating predominantly from the Greek and
Hellenistic and Roman Republican past: 567 out of a total of 583. The emphasis on
ancient exempla was partly shaped by Frontinus’ source material: many of the exempla
were already available in the works of writers such as Valerius Maximus (cf. Strat.
praef.). But Frontinus’ preference was also an expression of the esteem in which
ancient exempla were held in the literary and rhetorical culture of Rome. Cicero
asserted the power of ancient exempla, and on at least one occasion their superior
authority to recent exempla (Part. 96). Quintilian too extolled past exempla (12. 2.
29–31). The concern of Tacitus (Ann. 3. 55. 5) and the younger Pliny (Epist. 6. 21. 1, cf.
5. 17. 6) to champion the value of recent exempla is suggestive of contemporary pref-
erence for past models of conduct,31 and this preference, as J. Burckhardt observed,
28 The strategem occurs in relation to Pericles at Thuc. 2. 13. 1 and Fabius Maximus at Liv. 22.
23. 4 (una fraude ac dolo Hannibalis). Polybius stated that the art of generalship could be learnt
through reading history (11. 8. 1), as did Fronto (p. 128, 3–4) in the second century A.D.
29 Valerius Maximus aimed his collection vaguely at those looking for exempla to follow
(1. praef.: ut documenta sumere uolentibus longae inquisitionis labor absit), and his fourth-century
epitomator Iulius Paris expected to number busy professionals among his own readers (praef.:
exemplorum conquisitionem cum scirem esse non minus disputantibus quam declamantibus neces-
sariam). On Valerius’ audience see Wardle 1998, 12. For Ammianus cf. Momigliano 2012,
135.
30 Rhet. 3. 3 dolus consumitur in pecunia, pollicitatione, dissimulatione, maturatione, menti-
tione, et ceteris rebus de quibus magis idoneo tempore loquemur si quando de re militari aut de
administratione rei publicae scribere uelimus. Cf. Wheeler 2010, 21. For dolus as a synonym for
strategem see Wheeler 1989, 58–63.
31 Livy also regarded the recent past as offering compelling exempla (e.g. 9. 34. 14): see Chap-
lin 2000, 120–36. For Tac. Ann. 3. 55. 5 see Woodman – Martin 1996, ad loc. Tacitus devalues
a rhetorical recourse to antiquity in other ways. At 11. 23–24, opponents of the admission of the
primores Galliae to the Roman senate in 48 claim the Gallic sack of 390 as a more effective warn-
ing sign than recent history, but it comes across as bad taste in a weak speech preoccupied with a
jaundiced view of the past; Tacitus has Claudius in turn disdain delving deeply into the distant
past (see Malloch 2013, on 11. 23. 4; 11. 24. 2). At 15. 43. 5 the preference for the layout and
architecture of old Rome that Tacitus attributes to contemporary critics of Nero’s building pro-
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was a feature of the literary culture of the Roman empire extending into later
antiquity.32
Polyaenus’ selection of material confirms this trend in the same genre as Frontinus’
Strategemata and from a Greek point of view. Polyaenus’ exempla ranged widely in
chronological terms, from mythical figures such as Dionysus, Pan, and Hercules (1. 1;
1. 2; 1. 3), down through Greeks, Macedonians, and barbarians to the Romans as late
as Octavian (8. 24: all 43 B.C.?) – and no further. In the preface to book 6 Polyaenus
claims that he will record the «many good stratagems» that demonstrate the «excel-
lence» of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in their victorious campaign in the east,
but he does not seem to have fulfilled his vow and certainly none occurs in the surviv-
ing text. Polyaenus’ decision to exclude imperial exempla that were available in Fron-
tinus and subsequently at least for Trajan and give scant attention to Rome (in book 8)
has reasonably been read within the context of the preference of authors in the second
Sophistic for the Greek classical past, when Greece’s achievement rivalled Rome’s, over
contemporary history and themes that only reminded the Greeks of their lost auto-
nomy.33 If readers of Polyaenus perceived a gap in his selection of material, they pre-
sumably thought it normal, if not appropriate.34
III
The absence of imperial exempla in the Strategemata would not have concerned
readers in a culture that habitually looked to precedents from the Roman republican
past and beyond. But Frontinus does include exempla dating to the principate: one
concerns Tiberius (as priuatus), three the Varian disaster of A.D. 9, five Cn. Domitius
Corbulo, two Vespasian, and five Domitian (one of which features Frontinus himself).
If the abundance of exempla from earlier periods of history posed the question, «what
to leave out?», the recent past posed different challenges: «should I include imperial
exempla? If so, which ones?». This was not a question of updating the genre.35 Front-
inus’ inclusion of imperial exampla enhanced the continuity between warfare past and
gramme after the fire of 64 is not decisive: Nero’s efforts have just been praised by Tacitus in his
own voice. The younger Pliny can remark on the absence of contemporary excellence, when it
suited him to do so (Epist. 3. 21. 3); conversely, contemporaries can be exalted as exemplars
because they compared well with figures from the past: see Whitton 2013, 9.
32 Burckhardt 1853, 285: «Ein viel stärkeres, obschon stillschweigendes Zeugniss liegt
darin, daß alle Philosophen und Rhetoren – und auch die Dichter wenn sie nicht betteln gehen –
daß also die ganze freie Literatur des zweiten, dritten und vierten Jahrhunderts ohne Noth von
keinem Menschen und keinem Gegenstande spricht, der über das Ende der römischen Republik
herabreicht». For the Roman preoccupation with the republican past see Gowing 2005, 158;
Gallia 2012.
33 Bowie 1974, esp. 183, 208–09; Wheeler 2010, 23.
34 Cf. Bowie 1974, 189: «the omission presumes acquiescence on the part of writer and
reader in so glaring a lacuna». «Glaring» perhaps more to us than to the ancients.
35 Pace Wheeler 2010, 22, 42.
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present that underpinned the purported practical value of the Strategemata going
into the future.36 His selection of imperial exempla was also important. The scarcity
of these exempla drew attention to their subjects amid a crowd of past heroes, and
this context enhanced their subjects’ status as uiri militares through association.37
Frontinus’ commemoration of Domitian singles him out as representative of contem-
porary military excellence, and some of the more recent non-Domitianic exempla
provide him with distinguished precedents that reflect well on him. Frontinus’ com-
positional decisions aided Domitian’s quest for recognition as a general.
Those exempla dating from the early first century hardly present the principate as
exemplifying military excellence. Four date to the reign of Augustus, but the founder
of the principate is kept firmly out of the picture: his reliance on his generals, not to
mention imputations of cowardice, made him a problematic exemplar of generalship
in the field;38 Polyaenus would show Octavian achieve success by avoiding battle
(8. 24. 7) and otherwise as advising his generals (8. 24. 4) and disciplining or admin-
istering to his troops. Frontinus instead singles out Tiberius’ display of fine judgement
in timing a battle during the Pannonian wars. When the barbari formed for battle in
poor weather, Tiberius held his troops back and allowed the enemy to be weakened
36 Hence the small number of imperial exempla should not be read as implying that warfare
was different under the empire, pace Chrissanthos 2013, 326, cf. 320–1. Similarly, the useful-
ness of the text in the present was not compromised by its preoccupation with the past, pace
Goodyear 1982, 672. Conflation of past and present in Frontinus: cf. Gallia 2012, 203; in
relation to exempla generally: Chaplin 2000, 197–202; Roller 2004, 32–3.
37 Turner 2007 concedes that Frontinus does not criticise Domitian openly in the Stratege-
mata, but in a desperate methodological gamble claims that «silence about these contemporary
figures and even himself (except, perhaps, in one isolated incident from Domitian’s youth [sic])
may have been the only way in which … Frontinus could convey the jealousy and despotic
nature of his princeps to a discerning audience of educated Romans, who were often well aware of
the constraints under which writers were placed during the principate» (445). But could the
subtle Domitian not detect the criticism? Suetonius (Dom. 10.1) remarks that he executed Her-
mogenes of Tarsus because of allusions (figurae) in his history (cf. Mason 2003, 560; Kraus
2005, 184). Turner attempts to buttress his argument from silence by invoking Tacitus’ remark
that the imagines of Brutus and Cassius were conspicuous by their absence from the funeral of
Iunia Silana in 22 (Ann. 3. 76. 2). Frontinus’ «silence» about contemporaries in the Strategemata
apparently only draws attention to their absence, and Turner seems to assume that readers
would have attributed that absence, not to choices freely made by Frontinus, but to the restric-
tions of Domitian’s rule, which must be inferred from the historical context. The analogy is false.
The imagines of Brutus and Cassius draw their power from their unexpected absence from a situ-
ation in which they were expected to appear, whereas it is the presence of imperial exempla in a
text in which they were not expected to appear that renders them distinct. In any case, Frontinus
wrote the Strategemata before Tacitus wrote the Annals, and there is nothing in the funeral itself
which suggests an analogy with Frontinus’ method in the Strategemata.
38 Cf. Plin. Nat. 7. 148 (Philippi); Suet. Aug. 10. 4 (Mutina), 16. 2 (Naulochus); Cornell
2013, no. 60 F7 (C. Smith). Augustus’ reputation was the subject of propaganda, hostile and
apologetic. See Charlesworth 1933, 174–75; Smith – Powell 2009, index ‹Augustus, mili-
tary failures›.
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by exhaustion and the bad conditions: deinde, ubi fessum stando et pluuia non solum
sed et lassitudine deficere animaduertit, signo dato adortus superauit (Strat. 2. 1. 15).
The anecdote recalls a period (12–10 B.C. or A.D. 6–9) when Tiberius was laying claim
to be the leading general of his generation, before he notoriously declined to act in a
military capacity during his reign. As representative of warfare under Augustus in the
Strategemata, Tiberius’ exemplary conduct is overshadowed by three exempla that
date to the Varian disaster of A.D. 9 (2. 9. 4; 3. 15. 4; 4. 7. 8). Frontinus’ interest in the
defeat reinforces the impression conveyed by writers such as Tacitus (Ann. 1. 60.
3–62. 2) that it was regarded as one of the greatest military disasters of the early prin-
cipate: it is the German dux, Arminius, who provides a lesson in victory (2. 9. 4 Armi-
nius dux Germanorum capita eorum quos occiderat similiter praefixa ad uallum hostium
admoueri iussit), the Romans only lessons in the hardships of defeat: successful ruses
enabled the survivors to convince the enemy that they could withstand a long siege
(3. 15. 4), and the centurion Caedicius to prevent the torching of camp at Aliso (4. 7. 8).
Frontinus documents several legacies of the disaster for Rome. The citation of Armi-
nius alone of the enemies of Rome under the rubric de his quae post proelium fiunt: si
res prospere cesserit, de consummandis reliquiis belli (2. 9. 4) reinforces his reputation as
the liberator haud dubie Germaniae et qui non primordia populi Romani, sicut alii reges
ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium lacessierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello non uictus
(Tac. Ann. 2. 88. 2). The focus on Varus’ soldiers in the other anecdotes suggests that
one strain in the reception of the disaster at Rome sought to salvage moments of glori-
ous, exemplary conduct. That such moments focussed on the soldiers was part of the
criticism of the commander, Varus.39 Velleius Paterculus, for example, praises the uir-
tus of Caedicius and his men for devising a successful strategy of survival, of which the
ruse in Frontinus was a part,40 and remarks that the disaster owed more to lack of
judgement on Varus’ part than to an absence of uirtus in the troops.41
The exempla dating to the later first century provide important context and com-
ment on those featuring Domitian. Two focus on Vespasian during the Jewish War of
70. In the first he exercised good judgment about timing a battle (cf. Tiberius above)
by engaging the Jews on their Sabbath (2. 1. 17). In the second he displayed good-
will and moderation by honourably discharging a man who was ill suited to military
service (4. 6. 4). Cn. Domitius Corbulo attracts the highest number of the imperial
exempla besides Domitian himself. This focus is unsurprising: Corbulo was one of the
39 For «exemplary sub-elite actors» such as soldiers see Roller 2004, 6.
40 Velleius places Caedicius at Aliso (see next n.). Wolters 2009, 109–10, considers it pos-
sible that all three anecdotes in Frontinus took place there.
41 2. 120. 4 L. etiam Caedicii praefecti castrorum eorumque, qui una circumdati Alisone immen-
sis Germanorum copiis obsidebantur, laudanda uirtus est …; 2. 120. 5 magis imperatoris defectum
consilio quam uirtute destitutum militum. The same judgement of Varus occurs at Sen. Contr. 1. 3.
10; Tac. Ann. 1. 58. 2); Suet. Tib. 18. 1; Florus 2. 30. 33–4; Dio 56. 19. 1–3. Recent scholarship is
sceptical of a tradition that turned him into an incompetent scapegoat for the disaster: see Eck
2010, 24–5.
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most eminent generals of the early principate, and Frontinus could have served under
him in the east and had first-hand experience there of the incidents that he illustrates
here.42 While Corbulo doubtless urged his own distinction in memoirs of a distin-
guished career that his forced suicide under Nero fatally acknowledged, Frontinus is
the first extant author to accord him exemplary status, and Tacitus will follow suit.43
When Vespasian is contemplating seizing power, Tacitus has C. Licinius Mucianus
refer to Corbulo as capax imperii: abiit iam et transuectum est tempus, quo posses uideri
non cupisse: confugiendum est ad imperium. an excidit trucidatus Corbulo? (Hist. 2. 76.
3). Tacitus goes on to present Corbulo as an exemplum in the Annals. In a legateship in
lower Germany in the 40s that would establish his gloria (Ann. 11. 18. 2) Corbulo
appears as a dynamic general of the republican school of warfare who throws into
relief Claudius’ modern passive method of conducting res externae through diplo-
macy and his suspicion of military brilliance. Later in the east Corbulo evokes the
republican general Lucullus (Ann. 13. 34. 2; 15. 27. 1). His enforced suicide under
Nero would have allowed Tacitus to revisit the theme of the distinguished general v.
the jealous and suspicious emperor that dominated the early books of the Annals.44
In his first appearance in Frontinus Corbulo convinces the Armenians holding out
in Tigranocerta to surrender by catapulting the head of one of their captured nobles
into the middle of a council meeting:
(si res prospere cesserit, de consummandis reliquiis belli) Domitius Corbulo, cum Tigranocertam
obsideret et Armenii pertinaciter uiderentur toleraturi obsidionem, in Vadandum ex megistanis
quos ceperat animaduertit, caputque eius ballista excussum intra munimenta hostium misit. id forte
decidit in medium concilium, quod cum maxime habebant barbari; ad cuius conspectum uelut
ostento consternati ad deditionem festinauerunt. (2. 9. 5)
Tacitus’ version of the surrender of Tigranocerta is drawn with less lurid colouring.
After surviving an assassination attempt at the hands of the Tauraunites, Corbulo’s
envoys report of Tigranocerta that patere moenia … intentos populares ad iussa, and
Tacitus pointedly observes that the city was spared any humiliation in order to main-
tain its willing obedience (Ann. 14. 24. 4 nec quicquam urbi detractum, quo promptius
obsequium integri retinerent). Tacitus’ Corbulo behaves with a moderation that recalls
his appropriate handling of barbarians along the march (13. 23. 2) and stands in
contrast to the dramatic, decisive severity displayed by Corbulo in Frontinus’ version.
42 For this possibility see Eck 1989, 50; Birley 2005, 69. Of course, Frontinus need not have
served under Corbulo to want to include him in the Strategemata, and there is some scepticism
about according him a place in Corbulo’s army: see Vervaet 2003, 452.
43 Corbulo’s self-serving agenda is implied in his critical attitude towards Paetus: Tac. Ann.
15. 16. 3 quae ut augendae infamiae composita, sic reliqua non in obscuro habentur. For Corbulo’s
biography and memoirs see now Cornell 2013, no. 82 (B. Levick).
44 For Tacitus’ characterisation of Corbulo see Malloch 2013, on 11. 18–20. The Lucullan
echoes are discussed by Ash 2006.
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Frontinus and Tacitus both invest in Corbulo’s reputation for seueritas, which was
one indication of his greatness.45 Three anecdotes in Frontinus illustrate Corbulo’s
penchant for strict military discipline, and a fourth draws the moral:
(de disciplina) Domitius Corbulo in Armenia duas alas et tres cohortes, quae ad castellum Initia
hostibus cesserant, extra uallum iussit tendere, donec adsiduo labore et prosperis excursionibus redi-
merent ignominiam. (4. 1. 21)
Domitius Corbulo in Armenia Aemilio Rufo praefecto equitum, quia hostibus cesserat et parum
instructam armis alam habebat, uestimenta per lictorem scidit eidemque ut erat foedato habitu per-
stare in principiis, donec mitterentur, imperauit. (4. 1. 28)
(de effectu disciplinae) Domitius Corbulo duabus legionibus et paucissimis auxiliis disciplina cor-
recta Parthos sustinuit (4. 2. 3)
(de uariis consiliis) Domitius Corbulo dolabra hostem uincendum esse dicebat. (4. 7. 2)
Frontinus’ approach to Corbulo’s seueritas is thrown into sharper relief when set
beside Tacitus’ narrative of Corbulo’s eastern campaign. That narrative reveals that
Frontinus inadequately describes the number of troops at Corbulo’s disposal (4. 2. 3);46
no doubt a reduction in troop numbers enhanced the effectiveness of Corbulo’s
disciplinary regime. Tacitus also describes Corbulo’s punishment of troops in Arme-
nia by forcing them to camp extra uallum (Ann. 13. 36. 3). His fuller version has the
troops not merely give way before the enemy, but routed after disobeying orders not to
attack; only when the rest of the army intervenes for them were they spared further
disgrace. The explicitness of Tacitus’ endorsement of Corbulo in this episode is
brought out by the context. In the preceding chapter he lavishes detail on Corbulo’s
battle aduersus ignauiam militum (13. 35) and openly defends the execution of sol-
diers who had deserted: idque usu salubre et misericordia melius apparuit: quippe pau-
ciores illa castra deseruere quam ea, in quibus ignoscebatur. Tacitus’ concern to put a
positive spin on Corbulo’s seueritas is consistent with his rationalisation of similar
conduct during Corbulo’s legateship of lower Germany (11. 18. 3) and part of his
endorsement of Corbulo’s promotion of himself as an exemplary uir militaris: ipse
cultu leui, capite intecto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse, laudem strenuis, sola-
cium inualidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere (13. 35. 4). Frontinus’ use of a simpler
«misdemeanour» – there is no sign of initial disobedience at Strat. 4. 1. 21 – makes
Corbulo seem more strict than he does in the version that Tacitus takes up, but literary
comparisons are not needed to demonstrate that Frontinus is marking his position on
the reception of Corbulo’s seueritas: it is a model to imitate, part of Corbulo’s exemp-
lary status as a uir militaris. Frontinus’ inclusion of Corbulo in the Strategemata and
45 Cf. Langlands 2008, 165.
46 Cf. Tac. Ann. 13. 8. 2; 13. 35. 2; 13. 40. 2; Vervaet 2003, 437.
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Tacitus’ investment in his image as a strict, old-time general demonstrate that he was a
live figure in the political-military culture of the late first and early second centuries.
How do the imperial exempla that Frontinus deploys relate to those about Domi-
tian? The few earlier exempla do not distract attention from him: the priuatus Tiberius
in his one exemplum does not overshadow Domitian in his five, and the exempla about
the Varan disaster focus on a foreign leader and on acts of soldierly glory. It may be
tempting to read the exempla focussing on Corbulo and Vespasian against Domitian:
they undermine his exploits by comparison and the qualities and successes of Corbulo
and Vespasian create «anxiety» about his qualities and achievements as a general.
A stronger reading has these exempla work for Domitian. The implicit comparison
implied by the presence of Domitian’s father in the text could be flattering for the son,
as Silius Italicus (Pun. 3. 595–629) knew when he compared the military achievements
of Vespasian and Domitian, father and son, to the advantage of the latter. Corbulo
too bestowed glory through association. Any mention of Domitius Corbulo would
have evoked Domitian. Around 69 Domitian married Corbulo’s daughter, Domitia
Longina,47 and probably hoped to acquire some of his father-in-law’s glory in the pro-
cess. Her previous marriage into a family of military distinction, the Plautii, would
have increased her value,48 and marriage to Domitian would see her again attached to
a uir militaris – or to one who wanted to be regarded as such.49 Corbulo lived on
through Domitia and her name, just as the emperor’s own name Domitianus was
evocative of Domitius. The presence of Corbulo and Vespasian in the Strategemata
confirms by association the elevation of Domitian among the eminent uiri militares
of history.
IV
Domitian is the subject of four exempla, and he has a deciding presence in a fifth that
also features Frontinus. All but the last treat the campaign against the Chatti in 83 that
allowed Domitian to claim the much-needed military glory his father Vespasian and
his brother Titus had denied him during their reigns (cf. Suet. Dom. 2. 1–2). Domi-
47 Suet. Dom. 1. 3, cf. 10. 2; Dio/Xiph. 66. 3. 4.
48 Dio/Xiph. 66. 3. 4. Marriage to Plautii attractive: see Levick 2002, 201–02. She observes
that Domitia’s husband, L. Aelius Lamia Plautius Aelianus (PIR2 A 205), was the son of the
«great» governor of Moesia, Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus (PIR2 P 480), and related to A. Plau-
tius (PIR2 P 457), the conqueror of Britain, and to M. Plautius Silvanus (PIR2 P 478), who won
glory in the Balkans.
49 Dio/Xiph. (65. 3. 4) places the marriage after the northern uprisings, which must include
the revolt of Civilis, but Murison 1999, on Dio 66. 3. 4, places the marriage before Domitian set
out for the north with Mucianus. As Levick 2002, 202 n. 19, points out, Domitian may still have
desired the reflected military glory that she would bring to the marriage.
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tian’s campaigns extended Rome’s presence in the agri decumates (see below), but the
Chatti themselves were not completely vanquished.50
The later historical tradition denied Domitian military glory. Tacitus’ statement
that the Germans proximis temporibus triumphati magis quam uicti sunt (Germ. 37. 5)
is regularly interpreted as a barbed comment aimed particularly at Domitian’s war
that Tacitus will later describe as earning him a falsum triumphum (Agr. 39. 2).51 The
subtext was perhaps hinted at or elaborated by Pliny when he implies that Domitian
was defeated (Pan. 11. 4; 16. 3, cf. 82. 4–5). Suetonius’ minimalist claim that Domitian
went to war against the Chatti of his own accord (sponte) seems critical in view of the
provocations that he records for Domitian’s other campaigns, and this impression is
confirmed by the tepid statement de Chattis Dacisque post uaria proelia duplicem
triumphum egit (Dom. 6. 1).52 Dio, in the excerpt of Xiphilinus, aligned his account
more closely with the attitudes of Tacitus and Pliny when he observed bluntly that
Domitian did not see action at all in Germany, and he despaired of recording the hon-
ours showered insincerely upon him (67. 4. 1–2).
The contemporary response could not have been more different. Domitian
received imperatorial salutations, celebrated a triumph,53 and took the cognomen
«Germanicus», which he exploited for the rest of his life, especially on his coinage.54
Frontinus fell in with the laudatory reception of Domitian’s German military achieve-
ments during his reign. His commemoration of Domitian in the Strategemata
instantly accords him exemplary status,55 but he also deploys praise implicitly and
explicitly. Frontinus implicitly praises Domitian through his arrangement of exempla.
He places the first Domitianic exemplum in the first category of the first book (1. 1. 8
de occultandis consiliis), and it is the only exemplum dating to the imperial period in
that category. Frontinus commences his work by presenting Domitian as represen-
tative of military excellence in the imperial period, and he will maintain that status
throughout: he is the only imperial commander in the categories in which he
appears.56 Domitian gains from this uniqueness, and the alignment of his achieve-
ments with those of his Greek and Roman predecessors in war implies a continuity
that works in Domitian’s favour.
50 See Drinkwater 1983, 59; Jones 1992, 128–31; Griffin CAH2 XI 64. For subsequent
actions by the Chatti cf. Suet. Dom. 6. 2; Dio/Exc. UG 43 (p. 399) 67. 5. 1; Jones 1992, 150.
51 Tacitus’ remark has been interpreted as referring to Domitian’s Chattan war since at least
the time of Lipsius: see his n. ad loc.
52 Suetonius, notoriously lacklustre about his subjects’ wars, doubtless provided the source of
the brief notices in later latin texts (cf. Aur. Vict. Caes. 11. 4; Epit. de Caes. 11. 2; Eutrop. 7. 23).
53 Tac. Agr. 39. 2; Stat. Theb. 1. 18; Suet. Dom. 13. 3.
54 «Germanicus» appears on coins from 28 August 83 at the latest, and on inscriptions from
3 September 84 at the latest (CIL XVI 30). See Buttrey 1980, 52–56.
55 For the act of commemoration in an exemplary context see Roller 2004, 5.
56 Domitian embodies a uniqueness that Pliny will later apply in expanded form to Trajan:
Pan. 13. 5.
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In four of the five exempla featuring Domitian (1. 1. 8; 1. 3. 10; 2. 11. 7; 4. 3. 14)
Frontinus does not merely narrate a successful strategem (his method at 2. 3. 23) but
explicitly praises Domitian in the process:
(de occultandis consiliis) Imperator Caesar Domitianus Augustus Germanicus cum Germanos qui in
armis erant uellet opprimere, nec ignoraret maiore bellum molitione inituros si aduentum tanti
ducis praesensissent, profectioni suae census optexuit Galliarum; sub quibus inopinato bello adfusus,
contusa immanium ferocia nationum prouinciis consuluit. (1. 1. 8)
Frontinus has Domitian undertake a war of conquest in response to developments in
Germany (Germanos qui in armis erant) and with an eye to the interest of the prov-
inces. He has Domitian generate surprise through careful planning of a pretext for his
presence in the region, a census in the tradition of Drusus’ in 12 B.C;57 there is no lack
of motivation here that would characterise Suetonius’ version. Frontinus’ deployment
of the cognomen «Germanicus» in close proximity to the source of the award legit-
imises the official response to a war fought against ferocious and savage nationes. Such
barbarian stereotypes are no less effective in a text than they would be on a monument
in magnifying Domitian’s success, and they stand in contrast to the opposite tendency
to denigrate Domitian’s victory by claiming that he purchased and dressed up slaves
for his sham triumph (Tac. Agr. 39. 1; cf. Plin. Pan. 16. 3). Frontinus’ use of a condi-
tional clause to provide a reason for creating surprise among the Germans offers an
opportunity to praise Domitian in circumstances that did not come to pass and
among peoples beyond as well as within the limits of the empire: he is a tantus dux
whose approach would generate maior molitio. The judgment might be focalised
through Domitian himself but this was no self-praise: nec ignoraret implies that he was
aware of what was common knowledge. Frontinus’ device of positing a situation that
did not eventuate will recur in his handling of Domitian (see below). Here he renders
Domitian more conspicuous through his silence about the exploits of the other com-
manders in this category. Praise is deployed explicitly only in relation to Domitian.
(de constituendo statu belli) Imperator Caesar Domitianus Augustus, cum Germani more suo e sal-
tibus et obscuris latebris subinde impugnarent nostros tutumque regressum in profunda siluarum
haberent, limitibus per centum uiginti milia passum actis non mutauit tantum statum belli, sed et
subiecit dicioni suae hostes, quorum refugia nudauerat. (1. 3. 10)
From the larger picture Frontinus zooms in to illustrate Domitian’s capability as a
commander on the ground: his establishment of a military road network (limitibus
per centum uiginti milia passum actis) brings about the exposure and defeat of the
enemy.58 In another exemplum emphasising victory in Germany (2. 3. 23 de acie ordi-
57 Liv. Per. 138–39; ILS 212. 2. 36–9.
58 Laying the enemy bare seems more likely the result of driving roads into enemy territory
(cf. TLL 7. 2 1410. 29–84; Isaac 1988, 127; Moschek 2011, 55–6, 61) than of establishing
limites laterally (cf. Schoenberger 1969, 159). limitem agere is a standard expression for
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nanda) Frontinus illustrates Domitian’s skill in similar circumstances in the field: in
response to the Germans’ exploitation of the forest to their advantage he ordered his
cavalry to fight on foot: quo genere consecutus ne quis iam locus uictoriam eius morare-
tur. In our passage Frontinus takes a step further and emphasises Domitian’s achieve-
ment by commenting outside the parameters of the category: Domitian not only
changed the nature of the war (non … tantum) but defeated his enemies too (sed et).
This subjection of the Chatti, the (generous) official outcome of the campaign, places
the construction of limites in a different light: what seems like a mere tactic becomes
an extension of empire through victory, and Domitian becomes the only Roman
credited with expansion by Frontinus. Domitian’s limites combined with forts and
watch-towers to provide a system of military installations in the Taunus mountains
and Wetterau region which he linked over time with the forts established in the Upper
Neckar by Vespasian. The territory would fall within the province of Upper Germany,
which Domitian established c. 90. The expansion of Roman territory that commenced
with Domitian’s campaigns is confirmed by Tacitus, despite his hostility (Germ.
29. 3).59
(de dubiorum animis in fide retinendis) Imperator Caesar Augustus Germanicus, eo bello quo uictis
hostibus cognomen Germanici meruit, cum in finibus Cubiorum castella poneret, pro fructibus
locorum quae uallo conprehendebat pretium solui iussit; atque ita iustitiae fama omnium fidem
adstrinxit. (2. 11. 7)
Frontinus describes the loyalty of the Cubii that Domitian earned by compensating
them for the fructus of the territory that he had appropriated for his castella. The war
in question is identified by the mention of the cognomen «Germanicus» in the relative
clause, but the clause is not merely descriptive: the ablative absolute asserts the legit-
imacy of Domitian’s grant of «Germanicus». The climax of the anecdote is Frontinus’
claim that the fama of Domitian’s iustitia in compensating the local population won
the loyalty of everyone. Frontinus is glossing Domitian’s action by attributing iustitia
to him (compensation alone could have generated loyalty), and Domitian gains by
being eulogised alongside Scipio Africanus, for his multiplex magnificentia (2. 11. 5).
Iustitia was one of the more popular of the so-called emperor’s «virtues». It was
attributed to Augustus, in poetry and on the golden shield that the senate presented to
him in 27, and it was associated with Nerva and Trajan too.60 Iustitia may not have
driving a road: cf. Virg. Aen. 10. 514; Tac. Germ. 29.3 with Anderson 1938, ad loc., and
Moschek 2011, 50–52; TLL 7.2 1416.34–37.
59 See Drinkwater 1983, 59–61; Jones 1992, 131; Rives 1999, on Tac. Germ. 29.3.
60 Augustus: in poetry cf. e.g. Hor. Carm. 3.1–6 with Nisbet – Rudd 2004, 38–9; Fears
1981, 885, 886, 889–90. For the golden shield see the example from Arles (ILS 81); cf. RG 34.2
with Cooley 2009, ad loc. Nerva and Trajan: cf. below (De Aquaeductu); Fears 1981, 902–03;
Ramage 1989, 649 n. 19. On iustitia see also RE XXIV.2 2248; Wallace–Hadrill 1981,
298–323; Classon 1988, 301; Norena 2011, 60–66.
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been a «virtue» that Domitian actively boasted, but that was no reason for not apply-
ing it to him in the right situation and associating him with distinguished imperial
predecessors.
(de continentia) auspiciis Imperatoris Caesaris Domitiani Augusti Germanici, eo bello quod Iulius
Ciuilis in Gallia mouerat, Lingonum opulentissima ciuitas, quae ad Ciuilem desciuerat, cum adue-
niente exercitu Caesaris populationem timeret, quod contra exspectationem inuiolata nihil ex rebus
suis amiserat, ad obsequium redacta septuaginta milia armatorum tradidit mihi. (4. 3. 14)
Frontinus himself enters an anecdote as the general to whom the Lingones hand over
seventy thousand men in the revolt of Civilis in 70, but his role is passive and the
emphasis falls on Domitian.61 Flavian propaganda sought to embellish his role during
the revolt,62 and Frontinus participated in the process with his own significant
nuances. Frontinus’ opening assertion that Domitian held auspicia attributes to him a
prominence in the Roman response to the revolt that is starkly at odds with his repre-
sentation in the historical tradition. In fact the response was handled by C. Licinius
Mucianus, who placed Annius Gallus and Petilius Cerialis in command of advance
troops that had been despatched to deal with the situation (Tac. Hist. 4. 68. 1). Mucia-
nus marched north with Domitian in 70,63 but they had not even passed the Alps
when news reached them that the revolt was under control (cf. Hist. 4. 68. 3; 4. 85. 1).
Domitian therefore played no significant role in suppressing the revolt; even Josephus,
who inclines to Domitian here,64 emphasises the reality as he sought to downplay it
with a counterfactual: Domitian would have suppressed the revolt if Cerialis had not
arrived first (Bell. Iud. 7. 84–85). Frontinus’ tendentious presentation of Domitian’s
role is one strategy of embellishment. He also shared with Josephus an interest in
representing the enemy as submitting to Domitian. Josephus has Domitian respond to
news of the revolt with a keenness that belied his youth and display his father’s prowess
and his own good training in marching his troops north. The terror inspired by his
approach prompts «the barbarians» to put themselves at his mercy in order to avoid
disaster (Bell. Iud. 7. 88). Frontinus embellishes his version. It is the Lingones who
feared devastation at the hands of Domitian’s approaching army, and they give them-
selves up, not at Domitian’s approach, but only when the conduct of the army dem-
onstrated that their fears were unfounded. Frontinus works hard to generate a sense of
foreboding by establishing and repeating the expectation of devastation, only then to
61 Frontinus probably commanded a special force that made up part of the exercitus Caesaris:
Birley 2005, 69.
62 Jos. Bell. Iud. 7. 85–88; Mart. 2. 2. 4; Birley 1973, 187; Beard 2003, 549 n. 18 (but
Frontinus’ version of the surrender of the Lingones renders it unlikely that Josephus invented the
«victory»). For Silius see below.
63 Domitian evidently still had the consular imperium that he had received with the praetor-
ship (Tac. Hist. 4.3.4) and maintained when he was praetor urbanus (Suet. Dom. 1.3; cf. Tac. Hist.
4. 39. 2). See Jones 1992, 15–18.
64 For Josephus’ relations with the Flavians see Kraus 2005, 197 with bibliography.
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defeat it (… populationem timeret, quod contra exspectationem inuiolata nihil ex rebus
suis amiserat). The Lingones’ terrorised expectation turns Domitian into an awesome
figure, as he is in Josephus’ version, but by delaying the surrender of Lingones until
they realised that their city was safe Frontinus can present Domitian as a good general,
in control of his army and, again, mindful of the local population (cf. above 2. 11. 7).
Domitian emerges from Frontinus’ anecdote looking more important than the his-
torical tradition suggests he was. Frontinus too gains from being associated with an
emperor whose conduct he has embellished: modest mihi at the end of the passage
links with auspiciis Imperatoris Caesaris Domitiani Augusti Germanici at the start to
create a frame for the exemplum. This was not the first time that their paths had
crossed. At the start of the same year (70), Frontinus convened the senate as urban
praetor in the absence of the consuls, Vespasian and Titus (Tac. Hist. 4. 39. 1).65 He
soon resigned the office to make way for Domitian (Hist. 4. 39. 2 mox eiurante Fron-
tino Caesar Domitianus praeturam cepit; cf. OLD eiuro 3). Whether Frontinus acted on
his own initiative or not cannot be determined but he was probably well disposed to
the Flavians and acting in their interests. His extraordinarily rapid rise, from his prae-
torship in 70 to his legateship of Britain from 73/4, are evidence of Frontinus’ support
and exertions for a grateful new dynasty.66 The exemplum from the revolt of Civilis
allowed Frontinus to advertise an early and glorious instance of a connection that
would prove so advantageous to both parties.
V
Frontinus is not alone among his contemporaries in celebrating Domitian’s military
achievements. Silius Italicus, for example, has Venus predict inter alia that «Germani-
cus» will outdo the facta of his father and brother and claim that in his youth (i.e. in
70) he terrified the Batavians (Pun. 3. 607–08), and flattery permeates the Domitianic
poetry of Statius and Martial.67 Domitian placed enormous emphasis on his military
achievements and the writers of the period were caught up in the propaganda. But
ascertaining their autonomy is complicated by Domitian’s patronage of the arts. Mar-
tial and Statius acknowledged his inspiration and received privileges in return, Martial
the ius trium liberorum (2. 91–92),68 Statius a water supply for his Alban home (Silu.
3. 1. 61–4). Statius even submitted work for the judgement of Domitian (Silu. 1. praef.
17–19; 4. praef. 29–31), whose oratorical and poetical talents were praised by contem-
poraries (e.g. Sil. Pun. 3. 618–21; cf. Quint. Inst. 10. 1. 91). Josephus tells how Domi-
65 See Heubner 1976, ad loc.
66 Eck 1989, 52–3, observes Frontinus’ rapid promotion, practically unparalleled among
contemporaries. Crook 1955, 168 n.176, describes Frontinus as an amicus of the Flavians.
67 E.g. Mart. e.g. 7. 1; 7. 2; 7. 7; 8. 65; 9. 5(6). 1; 14. 34; Watson 2003, 9–12. Ramage 1989,
704, collects many references.
68 Domitian confirmed the grant by Titus: cf. Mart. 3. 95. 5–6.
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tian continued the patronage exercised by Vespasian and Titus and punished his
unsuccessful accusers (Vita 429). Quintilian was entrusted by Domitian with the edu-
cation of his great-nephews, and received insignia consularia as a reward for that honor
iudiciorum caelestium (Inst. 4. praef. 2; Auson. 21 [419 S.] 31).
Dating Frontinus’ Strategemata to the latter part of Domitian’s reign places its com-
position in an apparently quiet moment during a distinguished career.69 Frontinus
clearly did not depend on Domitian’s patronage of his literary endeavours. Equally
clearly he was not untouched by the imperial expectations that exerted such pressure
on the reception of Domitian’s military campaigns. Frontinus exploited both to his
advantage. In the Strategemata he publicly associated himself with Domitian during
the revolt of Civilis in 70, and a recently discovered and supplemented diploma places
him in command in Germany also under Domitian:70
[--- et] III Breucor[um, quae sunt in Ger]mania sub Sex. Iul[io Frontin]o, qui qu[ina] et uicena
plu[raue stipendia meruerunt item dim]issis ho[nesta missione emeritis stipendiis---]
Two dates for Frontinus’ command are possible, one between 73 and 74 (between his
first consulship and his proconsulship of Asia), the other between c. 81 and 83/4.71
The latter date, the more reasonable one on chronological grounds, places Frontinus
as legate of the army of Lower Germany during Domitian’s war against the Chatti,
a command that at once reveals Domitian’s faith in his loyalty and ability. Frontinus
would have been involved in the campaigns and witnessed Domitian’s execution of
the war first hand. That experience provided him with the exempla about Domitian
that he would record in the Strategemata, just as he might have deployed first-hand
experience under Corbulo.
Glorifying Domitian’s performance in war would have been congenial to an
emperor greedy for recognition of his talents. But Frontinus did not design the Stra-
tegemata to celebrate Domitian, in which case he might have dedicated it to him and
included more exempla illustrating his exploits.72 Nor is it credible that Frontinus was
coerced into a particular characterisation of Domitian: claims that Domitian practi-
cally abolished free speech were relevant primarily to men unsympathetic to the
regime (cf. Tac. Agr. 2), and a writer could choose to praise the emperor. Such a man
69 For the time of composition see Bendz 1938, 265–6; Eck 1989, 56; Rodgers 2004, 3;
Birley 2005, 70. There is no evidence that Frontinus was «apparently out of favour under
Domitian», pace Sherwin-White 1966, on Epist. 4. 8. 3.
70 For the inscription, reproduced in part below, see AE 2003, no. 2054; Eck – Pangerl
2003.
71 Frontinus would have been the successor of Novius Priscus, who was still in office in Janu-
ary/February 80, and would have vacated his command in time to be attested in his proconsul-
ship of Asia in 84/5. See Eck – Pangerl 2003, 209–10.
72 Yet a dedication was not decisive: Quintilian too praised Domitian without dedicating his
Institutio oratoria to him. The absence of a dedication does not therefore imply criticism: so
rightly Turner 2007, 436–38, 443.
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was Frontinus. He created a reciprocal relationship of benefit with Domitian through
the Strategemata. Frontinus, experienced in war himself, lent credibility to Domitian
by elevating his military achievements to exemplary status. This expressed on a tex-
tual level a real-life association between the two men that dated at least to 70, but
more obviously to Domitian’s recent German campaigns. The association also served
to bolster Frontinus’ reputation as a «man of war» by drawing him closer to the prin-
ceps, and his literary persona benefited as well: Frontinus’ background lent authority
to his Strategemata and he became the authoritative «author of war».73 The inclusion
of material concerning Domitian’s Chattan war may indicate that Frontinus wrote
the Strategemata earlier than the «lull» he apparently experienced in the latter years
of Domitian’s reign. As much as he claimed to be looking to the practical needs of the
future, Frontinus composed a text that exploited the moment. The Strategemata
played a role in enhancing its author’s status by capitalising on the official propa-
ganda of a militarily active, victorious emperor and on imperial high expectations.
VI
Writers reacted in varying degrees to Domitian’s memory after his murder in 96. Typi-
cal seem to be the responses of Martial and the younger Pliny. Their works are heavy
with criticism of the dead tyrant. Martial compares Domitian unfavourably with his
successors (e.g. 10. 72; 11. 7; 12. 5). In the Panegyricus Pliny denigrates Domitian as
part of his praise of Trajan, and in his letters he presents himself as nearly dying a
martyr under Domitian and barely surviving the downfall of his friends, tot circa me
iactis fulminibus quasi ambustus (Epist. 3. 11. 3; 4. 24. 4–5; 7. 27. 14; Pan. 90. 5). Pliny’s
claim of vulnerability was integral to his project of associating himself with the
victims of Domitian’s principate (cf. e.g. Epist. 2. 18; 3. 16; 4. 21; 7. 19); he was a
‹survivor› engaged in self-fashioning for a new regime. In fact he owed his flourishing
senatorial career to Domitian and was in favour to the end.74 Tacitus too paints a con-
sistently dark portrait of Domitian in the Agricola and in the Histories and he too was
concerned to mark a break with negative aspects of a past in which he felt all were
73 Hence, Frontinus is able to claim that he is writing the Strategemata for others, not meae
commendationis causa (1. praef. 3). This statement is part of the rhetoric of practicality (cf. 1.
praef. 1), not a disingenuous literary topos: it is Frontinus’ experience in war that creates auth-
ority for the Strategemata. Onasander offers a comparison in his Strategikos: he admits that not
everything he writes about derives from his own experience, but he claims authority from the
experience of others (praef. 7–10; Formisano 2011, 47).
74 For Pliny’s ‹project› see Whitton 2010, 126; 2012, 353–55; 2013, p. 7 and Epist. 2. 18 n.
A notable exception to his strategy occurs at Epist. 8. 14. 9 (see Whitton 2010, 126). For Pliny’s
career see Whitton 2013, 6; for his favour cf. Epist. 7. 33. 9 with Sherwin-White 1966, ad
loc.
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implicated.75 At the same time he could handle Domitian rather differently. He uses
him to establish his credentials as an historian: in setting out his political experience in
the preface to the Histories, Tacitus acknowledges that he owed further advancement
to Domitian (1.1.3), and in explaining why he refers readers of the Annals to the
Domitianic books of the Histories for his discussion of the calculation of the timing of
the ludi saeculares, he emphasises the prominent role he played in Domitian’s ludi
saeculares of 88 as a quindecimuir and praetor, positions that gave him privileged
insight into the organisation of the ludi and thus authority to write about them (11.
11. 1).76 Tacitus can portray Domitian as a tyrant in history, but to refashion his career
under Domitian in the manner of a Pliny would have been historiographically
counterproductive. Tacitus the historian needed the experience and status that Tacitus
the politician had enjoyed under Domitian.
Frontinus provides only one literary indication of his attitude to Domitian after his
death, at Aq. 118:77
commoda publicae familiae ex aerario dantur, quod impendium exoneratur uectigalium reditu ad
ius aquarum pertinentium. (2) ea constant ex locis aedificiisue quae sunt circa ductus et castella aut
munera aut lacus. (3) quem reditum prope sestertiorum ducentorum quinquaginta milium aliena-
tum ac uagum, proximis uero temporibus in Domitiani loculos conuersum, iustitia diui Neruae
populo restituit, nostra sedulitas ad certam regulam redegit, ut constaret quae essent ad hoc uectigal
pertinentia loca.
Domitian’s expropriation of the revenue from the rent of water-rights looks bad in
comparison to the policy of Nerva: diminutive loculos suggests that Domitian used the
money for his own purposes (i.e. it went into the fiscus), when in fact he may have
used it to support the familia Caesaris, which was paid from the fiscus (cf. 118. 4). This
was an easy, if not cheap, point to make (250,000 sesterces is «eine lächerlich kleine
Summe»78). Frontinus could praise Nerva’s iustitia and promote himself as curator
aquarum, an office that brought prestige and close contact with the emperor.79 Criti-
cism of Domitian sits merely in the background (in a participial phrase) and is dam-
pened by the observation that previously the money had gone missing altogether.80
This is all quite tepid in comparison to the hostility of Pliny and Tacitus. If Frontinus
75 For Tacitus’ attitudes to the so-called «Stoic martys» and to the delatores see Whitton
2012, 353–55. The rhetoric of shared guilt for the ills of Domitian’s principate is prominent in
the Agricola: e.g. 2. 3, 45. 1; Sailor 2008, 70–1; Whitton 2010, 126; Woodman – Kraus
2013, ad loc.
76 See further Malloch 2013, ad loc.
77 At Aq. 102 Domitian appears merely as a date.
78 Eck 1989, 58.
79 Eck 1989, 59. For Frontinus’ self promotion in the De Aquaeductu see now Koenig 2013,
370–74.
80 Griffin, CAH2 XI 74; Carradice 1983, 154–55.
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did react against Domitian, it was muted. But most likely he did not: he did not
need to.
Frontinus thrived under Domitian’s successors. He reached the peak of his political
career when he held his third consulship with Trajan in 100. In his Panegyricus, Pliny
draws attention to Frontinus’ third consulship, the short interval between his holding
the office for the second and third time, and the fact that Trajan’s holding the office
himself for the third time almost placed the men on a par. The distinction was extra-
ordinary. Trajan was rewarding Frontinus, Pliny makes clear, for political rather than
military services rendered.81 The background has been elaborated by W. Eck on the
basis of Trajan’s grant of consulships early in his principate: Frontinus engineered Tra-
jan’s succession.82 Pliny’s evidence places Frontinus in Rome in 97. There he worked
with others such as L. Iulius Ursus, also cos. II and III in 98 and 100,83 to engineer
Nerva’s adoption of Trajan, whose command in upper Germany located him close to
Italy with three legions. In this scenario Frontinus is a determining agent: Trajan «may
have agreed» that he was a better candidate to succeed Nerva than the other contender
M. Cornelius Nigrinus Curiatius Maternus (cf. Plin. Epist. 9. 13. 11), and Nerva,
whenever he was brought in on the plan, was «probably only a tool in their hands».84
Frontinus had the auctoritas, initiative, and connections to play the political game
at the highest level, and the second and third consulships were his reward for the
throne from a grateful Trajan. Such auctoritas made Frontinus’ praise of Domitian in
the Strategemata unproblematic, and irrelevant. He was, simply, untouchable: he sat
above «the ideological and careerist squabbles of the main body of the senate».85
Frontinus’ success allowed him to bestride two regimes that were more continuous
than the sources would have posterity believe. The careers of Tacitus and Pliny thrived
under the same circumstances, and the noisy atmosphere of hostility and apologetics
after Domitian’s death risk making a strong reaction appear normal. Frontinus seems
unusual primarily because the apologists sound loudest in the historical record, but
others who leave no literary traces flourished under the same circumstances, L. Iulius
Ursus, for example. Frontinus was confident of the rightness of his conduct. In a letter
to Cremetius Ruso, Pliny compares the attitude taken to funerary monuments by
Verginius Rufus, whose decision to have a monument Pliny defends, and Frontinus,
whose rejection of a monument Ruso judged melius rectiusque and parcior … et pres-
sior (Epist. 9. 19. 1; 9. 19. 6). Frontinus dismissed a monument as needless: his me-
moria would endure if his life deserved it (9. 19. 6 impensa monumenti superuacua est;
memoria nostri durabit, si uita meruimus). Pliny is right that Frontinus’ gesture was no
81 Pan. 60. 5 bellorum istud sociis olim, periculorum consortibus, parce tamen tribuebatur; quod
tu singularibus uiris, ac de te quidem bene ac fortiter sed in toga meritis praestitisti; 62. 2.
82 See Eck 2002, 219–26; cf. 1989, 60; Syme 1958, 13.
83 PIR2 J 630; New Pauly Iulius II 140.
84 Eck 2002, 224, 226.
85 Levick 1999, 178.
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more moderate or restrained than Verginius’.86 The confidence that he betrays in the
endurance of his fama, which was not to be established (or circumscribed) by a monu-
ment, also suggests a personality that would not agonise about past conduct. His claim
that a deserving memoria will survive is not inappropriate for the author of the Stra-
tegemata: it attributes exemplary value to his uita. Frontinus, in other words, will
attain the status of the great generals he writes about, and appears alongside, in the
Strategemata – but his life will provide lessons in politics too.
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